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Abstract
Germany is facing a contemporarymainstreaming of the far right, which has a long tradition ofwanting “Turks out!” Turkish
immigrants have been the main strangers in Germany following the guest-worker treaty signed in 1961, physically close as
friends, yet culturally distant as foes. From September 2015 onwards, German–Turkish politics of belonging, the Turkish
issue, underwent a contentious period resulting in secessions between German and Turkish authorities in September 2017.
Against this background, this article asks: How did mainstream political actors in Germany emplot the Turkish issue while
a far-right challenger party sought to establish a far-right narrative of ethno-national rebirth? The temporal unfolding of
the Turkish issue is explored by drawing on media analysis (n = 1120), interpretive process-tracing and narrative genre
analysis of claims raised by political actors in German and Turkish newspapers. In order to visualize how the Turkish is-
sue evolved between 2000 and 2017 in media discourse, 546 articles in the mainstream quality newspaper Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung were collected. The Great Secession period between 2015 and 2017 was selected for an in-depth case
study. To conduct interpretive process-tracing and narrative genre analysis of this case, another 574 articles in the German
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Turkish Hürriyet were analysed. In so doing, this article contributes to (1) the study of belong-
ing and identity by adopting a novel approach to boundary studies, combining narrative genre analysis with Habermas’
communicative action theory, and (2) the study of political strategies of adapting, ignoring or demarcating far-right con-
tenders by, again, introducing a narrative approach to political communication and mobilization processes. The analysis
shows that, in the first stage of the Great Secession period, inclusionary and exclusionary boundaries competed, while in
later stages inclusionary boundaries were cast aside by exclusionary boundaries after reputablemainstream party-political
actors adopted and thus legitimized far-right story elements.
Keywords
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theory; Turkey
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1. Introduction
The Turkish minority in Germany serves as a well-fitting
example of Simmel’s concept of the stranger: physically
close as friends, yet culturally distant as foes (Kaya, 2018).
The German magazine Der Spiegel reported former top-
secret British documents recording talks between then-
Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Christlich Demokratische Union
Deutschlands, hereafter CDU) and Margaret Thatcher
which reveal his ambition in the 1980s to halve the
size of Germany’s Turkish population because of al-
leged “cultural incompatibilities.” Indeed, his govern-
ment introduced a return programme for Turkish guest-
workers in 1983, which contained financial incentives
to encourage them to return (Hecking, 2013). This al-
leged strangeness has affected millions of people, al-
though there havebeen timeswhen Turkey andGermany
showed close connections at the turn of the previous cen-
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tury (Neumann, 1999), and has endured since Germany
and Turkey signed the guest-worker treaty in 1961. Today,
roughly 3 million Turkish immigrants live in Germany
and challenge regulations of membership and belong-
ing (Mandel, 2008). In 2000, German citizenship laws
were liberalized towards naturalisation and dual citizen-
ship. Since 2008, claiming to help sustain the Turkish di-
aspora’s Turkish cultural identity (e.g., “assimilation is a
crime against humanity”), Turkish President Erdoğan reg-
ularly aimed to (re-)vitalize the Turkish issue in Germany.
Interestingly, German politics remained unresponsive to
Erdoğan’s politicisation until 2015. Drawing on quantita-
tive data, this article explores how German politics be-
came responsive to such politicization and, drawing on
media analysis, how the politics of Turkish–German be-
longing unfolded from September 2015 onwards, facili-
tating a secessionist outcome in September 2017, with
formerly consensus-oriented German chancellor Merkel
now breaking ties with Turkish politics.
The Turkish issue is defined as a political discourse
that emerges in the realm of Turkish–German politics of
belonging between Germany, Turkey and the Turkish di-
aspora. It is enacted by political actors who raise politi-
cal claims embedded in wider narratives of people mak-
ing sense of the world. In this respect, political actors in
Germany and Turkey discursively construct the Turkish is-
sue through conflicts in politics of belonging. Narratives
serve a crucial social function to the politics of belong-
ing. They interpellate subjectivities (social roles) by fore-
grounding certain events and backgrounding others in
a meaningful storyline through which social boundaries
of “us” and “them” emerge. In (Western) literature the-
ory, such narratives are typically organized in four gen-
res: romance, comedy, tragedy and irony (Frye, 1957).
Comedies and romances are characterized by happy end-
ings for a self-sufficient and pure “us.” Communication
flows remain within the self-centred conclusive bound-
aries of “us,” the stranger is excluded fromopen and egal-
itarian communication processes (i.e., democratic de-
bate). Tragedy and irony, in contrast, facilitate open com-
munication processes that foster the inclusion of “new”
or dissimilar perspectives (i.e., the stranger’s perspec-
tive) on the basis of self-decentred and inconclusive so-
cial boundaries (Forchtner, Engelken Jorge, & Eder, 2018).
Against this background, this article asks: How do
German mainstream parties emplot their stories in pol-
itics of Turkish–German belonging vis-à-vis a rising far-
right contender? Germany is alleged to face a contem-
porary “normalisation” of the far right (Quent, 2019),
and the rise of populist far-right actors also accounts
for a wider continental Europe (van Kessel, 2015). The
German far right has a long tradition of wanting “Turks
out!” This was a famous campaign slogan of the German
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (hereafter
NPD) party in the early 1990s when Turkish immigrants
were victims of several racist terrorist attacks, and its
ethno-religious blending with Islam was recently loudly
voiced by the Alternative für Deutschland (hereafter AfD)
party (Özvatan & Forchtner, 2019). Research finds there
are contagious (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016;
van Spanje, 2010) or modest (Dancygier & Margalit,
2019) effects of radical-right anti-immigration positions
on the mainstream, while these studies of party po-
sitions fall short of exploring the deeper-level effects
on the political centre. That is, do far-right challengers
succeed in pushing for the adaptation of “their” narra-
tives by the political centre? Thus, this article more pre-
cisely asks: How do mainstream political actors emplot
(i.e. sustain or modify) their stories in politics of Turkish–
German belonging while an uprising far-right challenger
party seeks to establish a far-right narrative of ethno-
national rebirth?
The two-year period from September 2015 to
September 2017, which I call the Great Secession, was
selected for an in-depth case study of the Turkish issue,
for which 574 articles in the cross-nationally comparable
centrist quality newspaper German Süddeutsche Zeitung
and Turkish Hürriyet were amassed. To understand how
the Turkish issue arrived at a secessionist outcome, the
temporal unfolding of stories is explored by drawing on
interpretive process tracing and narrative genre analy-
sis of political actors’ statements in these newspapers.
This case selection is backed by three empirical find-
ings: (1) The media analysis of 546 articles in Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) between 2000 and 2017 points
to the increasing salience of the Turkish issue between
September 2015 and September 2017, (2) immigration-
related political concerns prevail in the German pub-
lic sphere from late 2014 onwards (Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen, 2019), and (3) the electoral successes of the
German AfD party. The Great Secession period was sub-
divided into three stages to trace how stories, story el-
ements and boundaries transformed during that period.
In so doing, this article shows that, in the first stage of
the Turkish issue, stories fostering inclusionary and ex-
clusionary social boundaries competed for hegemony,
while in later stages exclusionary ethno-cultural bound-
aries prevailed after reputable mainstream actors had
adopted and thus legitimized self-centring and definite
stories of “us” and “them.”
By adopting a novel approach to boundary dynamics,
a revised Habermas-inspired storytelling framework, this
article contributes to the study of politics of belonging,
social boundaries and collective identity. The inclusion
of “new” political subjects is more than the argumenta-
tive bridging of perspectives under the condition of mu-
tual recognition as legitimate speakers (Verständigung;
see Habermas, 1981, 1998). As Forchtner et al. (2018)
have convincingly argued, argumentation alone does not
cover the richness of social life, and thus the narra-
tively structured lifeworld context has to play a concep-
tually more central role. Consequently, the focus needs
to be shifted from argumentation to storytelling in or-
der to examine boundary dynamics in greater depth,
i.e., to make sense of how social boundaries span and
close. Following the argumentation line that some story
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genres (comedy and romance) instil self-centred and
definite boundaries, and others self-decentred provi-
sional boundaries (irony and tragedy), I argue that this
Habermasian-inspired storytelling approach marks a key
site for assessing inclusionary and exclusionary politics of
Turkish–German belonging.
In the next section, key theoretical concepts in stud-
ies on national belonging and social boundaries are in-
troduced. In Section 3, I propose the narrative bound-
ary model as an extension to the literature on bound-
ary studies. In Section 4, the within-case selection of the
Great Secession period is justified, and narrative bound-
ary analysis is applied to its three stages. A discussion of
and conclusion to the narrative boundary analysis of the
Turkish issue are presented in Section 5.
2. Barriers to the National Homeland: Contestations
over Belonging and Its Boundaries
Recent developments in the research on nationalism
move beyond hard facts, they include rather soft, yet
just as influential parameters such as symbolic structures
and feelings to make sense of national belonging and its
boundaries. In her seminal work, Nira Yuval-Davis (2011,
p. 35) defines belonging thus: “[It] is about feeling “at
home,” feeling “safe,” and if not necessarily feeling in
control, at least feeling able enough generally to predict
expectations and rules of behaviour.” Although this defi-
nition stresses the role of a “safe home,” it embraces in-
clusionary and exclusionary stories of national belonging,
thus covering political subjectivities which participate in
a constant process of (re-)production of cultural identity
and belonging (Hall, 1996).
Immanent to the analysis of symbolic social bound-
aries is an exploration of who is defined as inside and
outside a given society or community (Lamont &Molnár,
2002). The imaginary of a national homeland constitutes
such a community of us (Anderson, 1983), a national so-
cial order built on the ideals of purity and clarity which
seeks to eradicate ambivalence, danger and pollution
(Bauman, 1991; Douglas, 1966). It seems essential to clar-
ify at this point that symbolic boundaries do not imply or
refer to actual (i.e., material) social boundaries or actual
strategies of action more generally. As Hall and Lamont
(2013, p. 56) note, one can describe symbolic boundaries
through the concept of cultural repertoires, which “are
the sets of ideas, stories, discourses, frames, and beliefs
that people draw on to create a line of action in the first
place.” A social order materializes its structures follow-
ing meaningful symbols embedded in the stories peo-
ple tell to make sense of the world. For instance, “free
body culture” (Freikörperkultur) serves a cultural reper-
toire of “liberal” German ethno-national traditions em-
bedded in the (Western) rational Enlightenment narra-
tive, which may serve as a mobilising element according
to which “true” Germans oppose the Muslim headscarf
(as a sign of female oppression) in order to sustain “our”
free ethno-national way of living.
Research shows that the constitution of ethnic group
boundaries is a reciprocal process between social groups
(e.g., Barth, 1969). Barth argues that, in this process, so-
cial groups develop a collective consciousness of form-
ing a socially connected group based on sameness in-
cluding a boundary drawn to demarcate dissimilar “oth-
ers.” Others have theorized the making of these eth-
nic boundaries by distinguishing between thick/hard
and thin/soft boundaries (e.g., Wimmer, 2013; for a re-
lated intersectional account see Choo & Ferree, 2010).
However, the mechanisms of ethnic boundary transfor-
mation from “static being” to “fluid becoming” remain
under-researched in the literature. For example, Alba
(2005) explores the static production of blurry or bright
boundaries, yet there is rare theorisation of fluid be-
coming of boundaries, i.e., how a bright ethnic bound-
ary blurs over time or vice versa. Korteweg and Yurdakul
(2014) fill this niche when identifying one such mech-
anism of boundary-blurring in their comparative analy-
sis of the headscarf debate: Established host-society po-
litical actors must politicize established boundaries of
(ethno-)national belonging in order for marginalized im-
migrant political actors to blur those boundaries in the
public discourse. In the next section, I propose a theo-
retical model to systematically analyse the fluid becom-
ing of boundaries over time, that is, their brightening
and blurring.
3. The Narrative Boundary Model: Stories, Genres
and Belonging
In western societies, political parties engage in tamed
communication processes characterized by argumenta-
tive debate, though this evolves within a narratively
structured world. This means that beneath argumenta-
tion lies a narrative (genre) which stories actors, events
and boundaries (Forchtner, 2016; Forchtner et al., 2018).
Because of the storytelling foundation of political com-
munication, I define the politics of belonging as a polit-
ical drama that includes cultural performances, such as
crafting stories that create meaningful events, subjectiv-
ities and boundaries. Political parties’ performativity lies
in crafting stories; they enact political dramas through
which they seek to amplify popular resonances with the
masses. As such, political dramas may or may not res-
onate with the (cultural) stories of the masses (“fusion”
or “de-fusion” respectively; see Alexander, 2004). If an in-
group story fuses, affected members of the group expe-
rience emotions associated with a given narrative genre:
They recognize a plot, identify with “our” hero(ine) and
live the “feelings” provided by the plotline and the story
resolution (Forchtner, 2016; Wagner-Pacifici, 1986).
Adding narrative theory to Habermas’ theory of com-
municative action, the narrative boundarymodel defines
the story genre as a key mechanism of explaining the
(un-)certainty of the resulting boundary type dissemi-
nated in political dramas. I shall argue that tragic and
ironic stories facilitate spanning social boundaries, while
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comic and romantic stories draw rigid and conclusive so-
cial boundaries.
A well-established definition for narrative from
Toolan (1988, p. 6) postulates that “narrative is a per-
ceived sequence of non-randomly connected events.”
His definition emphasizes the role of temporality and
meaning-making for the non-randomized connection of
events. Meaning arises through creating a line of action
by back—and foregrounding certain events. Thus, nar-
ratives lend meaning to human experiences over time
(see also Bruner, 2004). The narrating human species sto-
ries its experiences in an event-based, sequential order.
Collective identities built on that narrative scheme. They
link storied projections of the past, present and future in
a narratively meaningful way to create a sense of com-
monality and belonging (Somers, 1994).
The prevailing four narrative genres inWestern litera-
ture are romance, comedy, tragedy and irony (Frye, 1957;
White, 1973). Genres have unique plot lines that con-
nect events in a narratively meaningful order (Figure 1).
As Figure 1 illustrates, plot lines are shaped by the com-
bination of two dimensions: the moral evaluation of an
event as positive (+) or negative (−) and time (𝑡).
To illustrate the former, Romeo and Juliet fall in love
at the beginning of the drama before the audience gets
to know the problematic background information. The
moral evaluation at that specific temporal point of the
story is heart-warming. Frye (1957, p. 162) argues that
the positive (+) and negative (−) spheres reflect two-
level imaginaries of the world, the ideal and the actual,
respectively. Plots in the lower half reflect the unide-
alized actual world (−), which is an analogy of realism
and experience, i.e., the complexity, conflict and am-
bivalence of the world, while plots in the upper half,
the world of idealized existence, represent romance and
innocence (+), i.e., storied phantasies of homogeneity,
unity and purity in the world.
The second dimension, time, covers the sequential
organisation of events through narrative. Usually, stories
are emplotted in three stages: the introduction of the
protagonists in the beginning, the middle stage in which
a problem emerges, and the ending in which the prob-
lem is resolved or not, which is commonly defined as the
story resolution. Wagner-Pacifici (1986, p. 282) argues
that in order to control the cultural meaning of a given
story, one has to control its ending, i.e., its resolution. In
fact, comedy and romance share a problem for the so-
cial order being resolved with a happy ending, which ren-
ders feelings of unity and self-sufficiency. Romantic plot
lines steadily climb to a heart-warming happy ending,
while comic plotlines sharply ascend from a downturn
sequence to a joyful happy ending (see Figure 1). Their
plotlines slightly differ though: Romantic downturns are
less tragic, they remain in the sphere of idealized exis-
tence, whereas comic deep downturns descend into the
intricacies of the unidelized actual world, which makes
the hero(ine) face a catastrophe before a sharp ascent
to the ideal world results in a “new-born society rising
in triumph” (Frye, 1957, p. 192). Because the sharp as-
cent releases accumulated tensions, festive celebrations
(e.g., fireworks, wedding, etc.) commonly feature com-
edy’s happy ending.
Tragic and ironic stories lack joyful, reassuring story
resolutions. In a tragedy, the tragic hero(ine) fails, in a
series of events (e.g., rescuing attempts), to hinder an
inescapable cathartic ending. The hero(ine) torturously
Tragedy
t
Irony
t
Comedy
t
Romance
t
Figure 1. Schematic representation of narrative genre plot lines (own visualisation).
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learns that s(he) is not self-sufficient, unable to solve
the intruding problems. In the literature, irony is not as-
signed a specific storyline; Frye (1957, p. 223) defines
irony as “the parody of romance.” He understands an
idealized form of irony, militant irony, as just another
form of comedy or romance that generates idealized self-
reassuring romanticism by parodying others. One way of
interpreting Frye’s definition of irony is to speak of self-
irony. Self-irony attempts “to give form to the shifting
ambiguities and complexities of unidealized existences”
(Frye, 1957, p. 223). That is, by means of continuous self-
reflexive distancing from previously held sets of beliefs,
self-irony is marked by “the sense that heroism and ef-
fective action are absent, disorganized or foredoomed to
defeat, and that confusion and anarchy reign over the
world” (Frye, 1957, p. 192). Since the distancing from
an idealized existence marks the nature of (self-)irony,
the plot line travels continuously between the idealized
world and the unidealized actual world. The hero(ine) is
never self-sufficient but constantly in need of debate and
renegotiation, i.e., inclusive democratic deliberation.
Political parties are mobilizing storytellers likely to
narrate comic plots. They claim that, with their help,
society will overcome an imminent challenge and cel-
ebrate “the new-born society rising in triumph” (Frye,
1957, p. 192); Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America
Great Again!” is a case in point. However, in the empir-
ical world, narrative genres rarely occur in pure form.
Storytellers instil story elements of other genres into
their plots (Engelken Jorge, Forchtner, Eder, & Özvatan,
2019; Özvatan & Forchtner, 2019). Indeed, Özvatan and
Forchtner (2019) illustrate that the German AfD party in-
creasingly implements romance into its comedy, which is
the evermore radicalising promise of an ethno-national
rebirth for “true”Germans defined by ethno-racial ances-
try/destiny.
Figure 2 represents the link between narrative gen-
res and social boundaries. This model contains two di-
mensions: the purity/impurity of the hero(ine) and the
restrictiveness/expansion of the discursive space. Jointly,
both dimensions explain the certainty-uncertainty con-
tinuum of the imaginary of social boundaries (dotted
diagonal line). The (im-)purity dimension refers to pro-
jected positive/negative images of the story’s hero(ine).
If the hero(ine) is portrayed as self-sufficient, s(he) is
pure and vice versa. The (im-)purity of the hero(ine) re-
lates to the discursive space too: If the story resolution’s
projected hero(ine) is self-sufficient/pure, the discursive
space for debating further steps shrinks. Thus, it appears
redundant to debate further steps when the hero(ine) is
capable of resolving an emerging problem satisfactorily.
In turn, the discursive space expands if the hero(ine) is
impure and not self-sufficient. The unsolved (or unsolv-
able) problem triggers a need to foster communication
processes, that is, debate further steps to be taken.
The interaction of both dimensions determines the
(un-)certainty of imagined social boundaries: (1) If the
hero(ine) is pure and the discursive space shrinks, the
certainty of the social boundary is high; in turn, (2) if
the hero(ine) is impure and the discursive space ex-
Irony
expanding
impure
pure
restricve
Tragedy
Hero/ine
(to what extent does the hero/ine of the story
project a posive or negave self-image)
Discursive Space
(to what extent does the story resoluon reduce or foster
the need to debate further steps/opons)
Uncertainty:
Imaginary of Indefinite
Social Boundaries
Certainty:
Imaginary of Rigid
Social Boundaries
Comedy
Romance
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the link between narrative genres and social boundaries (a modified version of the
model proposed by Forchtner et al., 2018, p. 12).
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 285–299 289
pands, the uncertainty of the social boundary is high.
The self-sufficiency of pure hero(in)es renders conclu-
siveness and certainty to social boundaries. Social bound-
aries become uncertain through the inconclusiveness of
a story. The potential for including “new” or dissimilar
perspectives rises as the story resolution’s lesson tells us
that our hero(ine) is not capable of solving the problem
without including the perspectives of others into commu-
nication processes.
Put together, rigid social boundaries are fostered by
romance and comedy, while tragedy and irony allow for
indefinite/blurry social boundaries (Figure 2). In a ro-
mance, “the good guys are clearly good from the out-
set: they wear the white hats while the bad guys wear
the black hats” (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986, p. 282). The un-
questioned purity and self-sufficiency of “the good guys
with the white hats” prove that they are the only legit-
imate interlocutors in a democratic debate. Jacobs and
Smith (1997, p. 68), for instance, argue that “nationalist
ideology is built upon the Romantic narrative of a ´na-
tional´ community with a distinct and ascending destiny.”
Comic stories are less restrictive than romances, the com-
position of the “good guys” may expand or shrink after
the reunification or reconciliation process. However, the
certainty of social boundaries rises following a unifying
happy ending. The “national” community is put back on
the right track, including a redefinition of who is part
of the common “ascending destiny.” In the absence of
ironic elements, it seems unlikely that the membership
criteria of the “national” community are extended to
“others.” In a tragedy, the hero(ine) is snared in a no-
way-out dilemma. To protect us from future tragedies,
communication processes may transcend social bound-
aries and include “new” or dissimilar perspectives. Irony
is the only genre that lacks a genuine plot line. This genre
is characterized by the hero(ine)’s distancing from es-
tablished commonalities such as, for instance, a com-
mon ethno-racial destiny. Such distancing from notions
of an essentialized and self-reassuring community fos-
ters open communication processes, which is a condition
for boundary-spanning and the inclusion of others.
In order to operationalize the linkage of narrative
genres and social boundaries for the empirical analy-
sis, I draw on three social boundary types postulated by
Yuval-Davis (2011, p. 21). The first is the racialized bound-
ary, which fabricates impenetrable boundaries through
ascriptive markers, i.e., ethnic origin, “race” and place
of birth. The second is the cultural boundary, build-
ing on language, culture and sometimes religion, which
may depend on “the other’s” assimilatory efforts to ac-
quire a host society culture (language, culture or re-
ligion) and, generally, involves a tedious process. The
third is the civic boundary, which understands belong-
ing on the basis of civic values such as “human rights”
or “democracy,” e.g., Habermas’ prominent notion of
Verfassungspatriotismus, which marks normative ideals
formulated in the constitution as nodal points for mem-
bership and boundaries.
Figure 3 is a schematic representation of where the
three social boundary types are located in the narra-
tive boundary model. Given that political parties nar-
rate comic plots combined with elements of other gen-
res, here I will describe the embeddedness of the three
boundary types in primarily comic stories. That is, I shall
Irony
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pure
restricve
Tragedy
Hero/ine
(to what extent does the hero/ine of the story
project a posive or negave self-image)
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the need to debate further steps/opons)
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of the link between narrative genres and social boundary types (own visualisation).
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illustrate in which directions the storied comedies move
on the uncertainty-certainty continuum. The more ideal-
ized ancestral elements (i.e., romantic elements) are in-
stilled into a comedy, the more the plot tends to move
towards the racialized boundary. If the moral evaluation
of ancestral elements (e.g., race, ethnicity, nationality
etc.) is not positive, that story is no longer a comedy,
which is why the racialized boundary tends to occupy no
more than the space from comedy to the upper end of
romance (Figure 3).
The cultural boundary is ambivalent as regards in-
clusive or exclusive boundaries of belonging; there is,
though, a strong tendency towards exclusionary (i.e.,
rigid) social boundaries. Hence, this boundary type tends
to cover only small portions of tragedy, which facilitates
indefinite social boundaries, and covers a considerable
share of definite boundaries (comedy and a considerable
share of romance). If a cultural boundary draws its legiti-
macy from a community’s romantically remembered cul-
tural imaginary, it intersects with the racialized bound-
ary. Such boundaries may enable individual boundary
crossing (see the taxonomy of Wimmer, 2008, p. 1044)
for “newcomers” performing a racialised majority cul-
ture, yet there is hardly room for blurring the boundary
on the collective level.
Civic boundaries extend from comedy to irony.
Historical events, such as the selective remembrance
of the Enlightenment, impeccably represent the over-
lapping space of cultural and civic boundaries. If the
Enlightenment past is storied as a(n) (ethno-)cultural
achievement, the derived civic values are hardly separa-
ble from its healed “achievers.” Ironic elements disturb
such idealized/romantic portrayals of “achievers” by pin-
pointing “our” past failures, ambivalences, and impuri-
ties. The more ironic elements are installed into a com-
edy, the more the self-reflexivity and indefiniteness of
the social boundary is facilitated.
4. Method, Data and Analysis: Exploring the
Turkish Issue
Erdoğan prominently politicized matters of Turkish–
German identity and belonging on German grounds
four times from 2000 onwards. These four symbolically
charged events included rhetoric attacks on German au-
thorities for their alleged mistreatment of Turkish immi-
grants (i.e., devaluation of their Turkish origin/culture).
The Turkish President performed an ethno-national
leader standing up for Turks on a global scale. Figure 4
illustrates his four attempts to trigger debates over cul-
tural identity in Germany and the reactions shown by
German mainstream politics (Figure 4). Hintz (2018) pos-
tulated that Erdoğan’s attempts stem from his party’s
need to sustain identity politics, including his aim to
disseminate the AKP party’s core neo-Ottoman national
identity narrative against secular Kemalist elites. She con-
tends that once domestic national identity contestation
was entrenched in Turkey, the AKP party extended it to
the domestic-foreign policy nexus to appeal to both the
domestic and the diaspora vote. Considering its popu-
lation size, the Turkish diaspora in Germany was a wel-
come target for the Turkish President (and former Prime
Minister). Turkish immigrants were granted voting rights
from the 2014 Presidential Election onwards through a
new policy reform. However, the puzzle is to learn when
German politics was vulnerable to his conflictual politi-
cisation attempts and to ask how the politicisation in
the Great Secession period actually relates to the se-
cessions in September 2017. These questions stream
into the broader research question which explores how
mainstream political actors emplot (i.e. sustain or mod-
ify) their stories in politics of Turkish–German belonging
while an uprising far-right challenger party seeks to es-
tablish a far-right narrative of ethno-national rebirth.
4.1. Case Selection: Political Context of the Turkish Issue
in German Politics (2000–2017)
Three contextual factors seemed to trigger the politici-
sation of the Turkish issue in Germany from September
2015 onwards: (1) German politics became vulnerable to
Erdoğan’s advances when, as of late-2014, the German
public was prevailingly concerned with cultural iden-
tity issues (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2019), (2) the
German AfD party started a series of electoral successes
from May 2014 onwards and transformed the core
theme of its comic story from neoliberal Euroscepticism
to ethno-nationalism (Özvatan & Forchtner, 2019), and
(3) media debates of the Turkish issue increased to un-
precedented high scores after 2015 (Figure 5). These con-
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Figure 4. Four attempts at vitalising the Turkish issue (own visualisation).
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textual factors indicate that German politics became vul-
nerable to the politicisation of the Turkish issue after
2015. A close look at the FAZ data shows (Germanmedia
discourse on the Turkish issue, see below) that the num-
ber of media articles increased from September 2015,
too. Consequently, the Great Secession period from
September 2015 to September 2017 is selected for an in-
depth case study to explore how narratives of German
politics evolved over time and eventually arrived at the
secessionist outcome. In September 2017, after a series
of Germany-blaming by Erdoğan, consensus-oriented
Angela Merkel finally broke ties with him and promised
she would bring the potential of bringing EU–Turkey ac-
cession talks to a standstill to the agenda (Usta, 2017);
the standstill was declared by the EU Commission in
June 2018.
The media analysis of FAZ data provides a general
overview of how the media discourse on the Turkish
issue evolved in Germany between 2000 and 2017
(Figure 5). As salience of political issues and claims raised
by political actors vary only marginally across quality
newspapers in Western Europe (Koopmans, Statham,
Giugni, & Florence, 2005), data collection for the gen-
eral media discourse was restricted to one mainstream
quality newspaper. To reflect trends in the media dis-
course of the Turkish issue across time, FAZ data were in-
ductively coded into sevenmacro-topics: EU–Turkey rela-
tions, foreign civic dialogue, foreign policy, foreign trade,
immigrant integration party politics, immigrant integra-
tion and Turkish party politics. Macro-topics are discur-
sive knowledge structures via which consumers of media
data understand and summarise texts, i.e. media articles
(van Dijk, 1991). Macro-topics which scored below an an-
nual average of three articles or less than ten articles in
a single year were excluded. Excluded macro-topics are
foreign trade (n = 26), immigrant integration party poli-
tics (n = 38) and party competition in Turkey (n = 47).
Figure 5 illustrates that lively debates on the Turkish
issue crystallized around twomacro-topics between 2000
and 2008 (34 articles on annual average): acceptance of
Turkey as a candidate country to the EU (EU–Turkey re-
lations) and liberalisation of the German citizenship law
(immigrant integration politics). After the general debate
flattened between 2009 and 2015 (15 articles on annual
average), contention between Germany and Turkey (for-
eign policy) peaked to a record high of 36 articles in
2016 which even almost doubled to 62 articles in 2017
(Figure 5). These numbers point to the contentious pe-
riod that surrounded Erdoğan’s fourth attempt at vitalis-
ing the Turkish issue in July 2016 (Figure 2).
4.2. Research Strategy: The Processual Nature
of Narrative
Two research techniques were combined for the case
study of the Great Secession period: process tracing and
narrative genre analysis. Process tracing is amethodolog-
ical technique for within-case analysis. Interpretivist pro-
cess tracing, as a counterpart to the more established
positivist process tracing, relies first and foremost on the
(thick) description of events (and their interpretation)
over time (Guzzini, 2012; for a general discussion of in-
terpretivist and positivist process tracing see Bennett &
Checkel, 2014). This criterion makes it particularly suit-
able with narrative genre analysis of political claims be-
cause of narrative’s processual character, “narrative in-
volves movement from one structure to another” (Frye,
1957, p. 158). However, events mark an ambivalent phe-
nomenon in narrative theory: On the one hand there is
a “real” discursive event, e.g., the EU-Turkey declaration,
while on the other there is the narrative backgrounding
or foregrounding of that discursive event. Interpretivist
process tracing is included into the analysis to account
for the unfolding of “real” discursive events, which then
facilitates the exploration of how narrative genres unfold
in the course of these discursive events.
The combination of process tracing and narrative
genre analysis thus enables a comparative analysis of
three identified subsequent stages of theGreat Secession
with a focus on tracing how narratives (and story ele-
ments) travelled across stages in this process to seces-
sions between Germany, the EU, Turkey and Turkish–
Germans. To do so, another 574 articles were gath-
ered from quality newspapers in Germany (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 368 articles) and Turkey (Hürriyet, 206 articles)
whichwere selected because they take comparablemain-
Figure 5. The Turkish issue in the German media discourse (own data collection).
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stream positions in both countries. Hence, the wholeme-
dia data analysis relies on a total of 1120 quality news-
paper articles in which political claims raised by political
actors formed the data for narrative genre analysis.
4.3. The Great Secession of 2015–2017
During the Great Secession period the AfD party con-
veyed stories which combine far-right authoritarian and
ethno-nationalist tropes with a populist style (Moffitt,
2016; Mudde, 2007): Only “the people,” their suppos-
edly homogeneous will being represented by the AfD,
can guarantee cultural/racial purity, an ethno-national
rebirth against self-serving and deluded elites (Özvatan
& Forchtner, 2019). Romantic racialized story elements,
e.g., the Long Durée of German ethnic community, ren-
der moral authority and exigency to the idea of “saving”
the German people from a “Muslim pollution threat” or,
in the words of the AfD co-leader Alexander Gauland, a
“creeping land grab” by Islam (Bender, 2017). This racial-
ized comedy-romance story of the AfD crafts an ances-
tral pure and self-sufficient hero(ine). The high certainty
of the ethno-nationally defined social boundary excludes
“the other” from discourse, paving the way for communi-
cation processes to remain among “true” Germans after
a promised ethno-national rebirth.
In the following, three stages of the Great Secession
period are comparatively analysed with a focus on “ac-
tual” discursive events and the narrative ordering of
events by political parties (i.e., mobilizing storytellers). It
is described howmainstream political parties (1) (re-)tell
stories of “us and them” and (2) thereby demarcate or
accommodate the racialized comedy-romance story of
the AfD.
4.3.1. Stage I: Road to the EU–Turkey Migration Deal
(September 2015–March 2016)
The civic boundary competed with the cultural boundary
in this stage. The trope of a European Solution to social
grievance associated with the 2015 refugee crisis imple-
mented ironic elements (civic boundary; see Figure 6),
which facilitated detachment from an idealized ethno-
national sovereign thus facilitating debate over the inclu-
sion of Turkish identity by pulling the comic story towards
inconclusive social boundaries. The cultural boundary
emerged through the implementation of romanticized
cultural superiority elements. The CSU emphasized “our”
cultural achievements (i.e., press freedom, freedom of
speech), in response to demands by the Turkish leader
Erdoğan, while the Greens and the Left party narrated
similar stories (Figure 6). Other than the latter two par-
ties, the CSU also gave particular space to ancestral
elements of the national sovereign which demarcated
national and European boundaries along the romanti-
cized lines of religion, i.e., the EU as a non-Muslim
club. Gerda Hasselfeldt (CSU) followed Seehofer’s at-
tempt to impede visa waivers for Turkish citizens when
she added that the migration deal with Turkey must in-
clude a clause that guarantees Turkey will not become
a full member of the European Union (Rossmann, 2016),
which underscored the story of Europe as a non-Muslim
club (Figure 6). These tropes show a proclivity to the
AfD’s narrative which warns “the German people” to
act against a Muslim pollution threat, while the AfD’s
comedy-romance story is, frankly, much more racialized
than the CSU story at that stage.
In October 2015, German Chancellor Merkel re-
iterated her call for a European solution to the
European “refugee crisis” when visiting President
Erdoğan. Merkel’s call for a European solution reverber-
ated with the civic boundary (Figure 6). The solution to
a current humanitarian refugee crisis is not predefined
along the lines of an ancestral community in her story;
its solution is up for debate between political actors
from within and beyond the EU willing to solve it. In this
respect, Merkel’s comic European Solution story blurs
established social boundaries and counters an ironic ir-
ritation of the supposed self-sufficiency of the national
sovereign (highlighted in grey in Figure 6).
Later, in light of the approaching EU–Turkey migra-
tion deal (which was declared on 18 March 2016), then
Figure 6. Comedy-romance (cultural boundary, white clouds) and comedy-irony (civic boundary, grey clouds) in Stage I.
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SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel criticized Seehofer (CSU) for
stabbing Merkel in the back when demanding renewed
requirements for visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens
(“Gabriel: Seehofer fällt,” 2016). During that period the
Left and the Green party called for humanitarianism
(“Drama in Idomeni, Appell an Merkel,” 2016) and the
CSU voiced critical stances against this deal with the
Turkish leader being blamed for authoritarianism and ig-
noring democratic rights (Rossmann, 2016; see Figure 6).
It is characteristic that the Süddeutsche Zeitung released
an article entitled “Merkel’s Dependence on Sultan
Erdoğan” (Schlötzer, 2016). Orientalist tropes portraying
Turkey as led by a “Sultan” were prominent and reverber-
ated with cultural boundaries (Figure 6). The externali-
sation of anti-democratic performances and its blending
with orientalism give rise to a comic story about German
national sovereignty’s indispensable Enlightenment past.
The German hero(ine) will always stand for firm protec-
tion of (“our”) domestic culture of liberal democratic val-
ues andhuman rights, an elementwhich serves both end-
ings (highlighted in lighter grey in Figure 6).
4.3.2. Stage II: Mainstream Party Zigzag in the Post-deal
Period (April–December 2016)
In all five 2016 Federal State elections, the AfD cele-
brated an electoral breakthrough: the party ranked sec-
ond in the Eastern and third in the Western German
states (fifth in Berlin, though taking 15% of the vote
share). In this stage, the cultural boundary gained mo-
mentum and the civic one diminished continuously. The
cultural boundary revolved around Turkish Germans’
“conflict of loyalties” between fixed notions of an
“enlightened German culture” and a “non-enlightened
Turkish culture.” This story’s cultural superiority based
on “our” ancestral Enlightenment culture resembles the
AfD story but is less racialized, thus less conclusive social
boundaries are fostered (see Figure 7).
Once the EU–Turkey migration deal was announced,
Germany-Turkey relations notably deteriorated. A satir-
ical poem by German comedian Jan Böhmermann,
which mocked Turkish President Erdoğan, developed
into a diplomatic drama. Erdoğan invited Turkey’s
German ambassador to question why Böhmermann
had not been reproached, despite Merkel describing
the poem as “deliberately harmful” (“Merkel nennt
Böhmermanns Erdoğan-Gedicht,” 2016). Then-president
of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz (SPD), re-
sponded harshly: “[We] must make it clear to Erdoğan:
In our country, there is democracy” (“Schulz: ‘Lieber
Herr Erdoğan,”’ 2016). His statement perpetuated the
as simplistic as dichotomising cultural boundary invoked
by parts of the German mainstream already in Stage I:
the Orientalist story of our legitimate democratic culture
here, and their non-democratic culture there (Figure 7).
The Turkish issue heated up further in June 2016
when the German Bundestag held a non-binding vote
on a resolution to formally accept the term “Armenian
Genocide.” The Turkish President came forward with a
hard-hitting speech accusing Germany of Islamophobia
and question its legitimacy, “the first country that comes
to one’s mind when asked about ‘genocide.”’ (Purtul,
2016). In the same speech, he questionedCemÖzdemir’s
(Green party) Turkish identity, stating that his, and
the other 11 Turkish German MPs’ blood was “defec-
tive” (kanı bozuk), which he combined with a(n) (ethno-
nationalist) populist message, he alleged that they were
Germany-based sleepers for anti-Turkish terror organ-
isations directed by a global “mastermind” (üst akıl)
which seeks to undermine Turkey’s ethno-national resur-
rection. The attacked Turkish German MPs complained
of receiving death threats from ultranationalist Turkish
movements and individuals in Germany. Zekeriya Altuğ, a
board member of the Germany-based immigrant organi-
sation DITIB (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs),
institutionally affiliated with Turkey’s State Department
for Religious Affairs, criticized that the attacked MPs no
longer represent the Turkish German community, while
other (then) board members such as Murat Kayman and
Bekir Alboğa condemned the threats against the 11 at-
tacked MPs (“Islamverband Ditib kritisiert türkeistäm-
mige Abgeordnete,” 2016). Norbert Lammert (CDU),
then President of the Bundestag, reprimanded Erdoğan
for attacking members of the Bundestag and thanked
Figure 7. Comedy-romance story (cultural boundary) in Stage II.
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 285–299 294
the Turkish Association in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and
the Turkish Community in Germany (TGD) for their im-
mediate and unambiguous distancing from Erdoğan’s at-
tacks (Fried, 2016). The cultural boundary unfolded re-
markably in this event: the German state authorities
performed “their” Enlightenment-based German demo-
cratic culture by protecting immigrant political actors and
included only those immigrant organisations into com-
munication processes that performed their “learning” of
German “Leitkultur” when distancing themselves from
the Turkish Leader, “Sultan Erdoğan” (Figure 7).
After the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July
2016, the AKP party and the Union of European Turkish
Democrats (hereafter UETD) organized a “democracy
rally” against the coup attempt in Cologne, where
Erdoğan supporters wore German and Turkish sym-
bols and sang both national anthems. Jens Spahn
(CDU) reproached Turkish–Germans’ alleged disloyalty
and lamented their “conflict of loyalties” (“Warnungen
vor Einflussnahme der Türkei bei Demonstration in
Deutschland,” 2016). The discourse on “conflicts of loy-
alties” amplified the question: “Loyalty to which commu-
nity?” On the surface level, the variation of discursive el-
ements gave final shape to the narrative of a romanti-
cally remembered ethno-national community while the
cultural and racialized boundaries shared a comedy-
romance storyline (see Figure 8 in Stage III). The emerg-
ing cultural boundary showed a supposed and condi-
tional openness towards Turkish–Germans which were
expected to ostensibly perform German “Leitkultur” to
remove their “inner conflict” (Figure 7) or the host so-
ciety will withdraw the right to belong once recognised
and granted to them. The “inner conflict” discourse im-
plemented the racialized boundary too, this being the
story of a culture of ethno-national incompatibility with
“our” democratic values because of “their” Ottoman an-
cestry. This story unfolded in the next stage and made
the German political mainstream approach the ancestral
ethno-national rebirth story circulated by the AfD.
4.3.3. Stage III: The Final Curtain ahead of General
Election 2017
The final curtain showed the racialized boundary even-
tually enter mainstream politics, though still sharing
some elements with the cultural boundary. Their nodal
point crystallized around an ancestral, romanticising
Enlightenment story element, which facilitates feel-
ings of self-sufficiency and reassures the hero(ine) of
“our” eminent particularity, if not greatness (Figure 8).
Idealized racialized expressions of the Turkish “other”
were increasingly having a heyday, alleging that the
supposed anti-democratic, ancestral Ottoman culture
causes “conflicts of loyalties” in Enlightenment Germany
(Figure 8). A story, once initially and exclusively espoused
by the far-right AfD, occupied substantial shares of main-
stream narratives in the third stage.
The political context was driven by election peri-
ods both in Germany and Turkey. Besides the fast-
approaching general election in September 2017, the
German party system was ahead of three federal state
elections. The Turkish government, itself approaching a
constitutional referendum in April 2017, which would ef-
fectively concentrate more power in the hands of the
president, perpetuated its demands for “the Turkish peo-
ple” vis-à-vis Germany and the EU. Both party systems
were thus in electoral competition mode.
After then-PrimeMinister Binali Yıldırım (AKP) held a
campaign event in Oberhausen, German opposition par-
ties called for a ban on the Germany-based campaign
events of the AKP which were alleged to be in support of
authoritarianism and reiterated their criticism of Angela
Merkel’s (alleged) concessions to the Turkish president
(“Yıldırım,” 2017). This story perpetuated the cultural
boundary proposing thatGermansmust eventually stand
up for “their” democratic values against Turkey’s (suppos-
edly) authoritarian leader who seeks to mobilize and in-
stil anti-democratic views in our German society:We, the
enlightened German people, must oppose the import of
Figure 8. Stage III comedy-romance story with two happy endings, racial (white) and cultural (grey) boundaries.
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anti-democratic views and remain true to our ideals. By
defining such ideals as “ours,” mainstream actors mobi-
lized claims of ancestral ownership of these values by
mere Germanness, which increasingly racialized bound-
ary elements to the comic cultural boundary story.
That became apparent in March 2017 when German
municipalities blocked AKP campaign events, which
made Erdoğan contend that “if I want to, I will come to
Germany” and blame the German authorities for “Nazi
practices” (Bielicki, Hickmann, & Szymanski, 2017). In
mid-August, Erdoğan invited Turkish Germans to protest
against the Green, CDU and SPD parties in the up-
coming general election because they were “hostile
to Turkey” (“Bundestagswahl,” 2017; Usta, 2017). In
turn, Merkel questioned whether, under these impair-
ing circumstances, the EU should extend the Customs
Union with Turkey after twenty years of its existence
(Fried, 2017). Eventually, in the pre-election TV debate
(3 September 2017), Merkel and Schulz engaged in com-
petitive zeal to demonstrate who could adopt a stricter
stance against Erdoğan, once (re-)elected, in the name of
our democracy; and they both resolutely called for a can-
cellation of EU–Turkey accession talks (Brössler, 2017).
Even Merkel, who invoked a comedy-irony story (civic
boundary) in Stage I, now resorted to a comedy-romance
(cultural boundary) which circulated a vision of “us” as
the enlightened people who own democratic values and,
ultimately, resulted in ethno-nationally secessionist poli-
tics in German politics’ Turkish issue (Figure 8).
5. Conclusion
How did the German mainstream parties emplot their
stories in the Great Secession period vis-à-vis a rising far-
right contender? Substantial shares of mainstream politi-
cal parties adapted the AfD’s racialized comedy-romance
story, which suggests that the story and the AfD party as
a mobilizing storyteller have been legitimized in the po-
litical centre. In the first stage of the Great Secession, the
inclusionary civic boundary competed with the rather ex-
clusionary cultural boundary. As such, story elements of
“our” cultural superiority based on “our” ethno-national
community’s Enlightenment past spreadwithin themain-
stream and increasingly instilled elements of the AfD’s
ancestral romanticism (i.e., ethno-national destiny) in
subsequent stages. In this context, comedies with ironic
elements which disseminate inconclusive social bound-
aries, such as Merkel’s European Solution story, phased
out. It is unsurprising then that the discursive space for
accommodating the complexity and diversity of Turkish–
German belonging happened to shrink, and a secession-
ist outcome to appear, when narratives of an ancestral
neo-Ottoman revival in Turkey and of ethno-national re-
birth in German politics made up leeway.
Building on a revised storytelling approach to
Habermasian communicative action theory, this arti-
cle has sought to explore the opening and blocking
of communication processes (of social boundaries) in
the politics of Turkish–German belonging. The analysis
indicates that the political centre took steps towards
rigid ethno-cultural boundaries between “Germans” and
“Turks.” However, even if mainstream political parties
merely intended to adapt far-right positions as a short-
term strategy to regain disenchanted voters, the unin-
tended effect is that the powerful unfolding of a nar-
rative genre is triggered. If the comic story conveys an
idealized ethno-nationally pure hero(ine) and audiences
have associated feelings, popular mobilisation gains a
hardly stoppable momentum. That is, once the audi-
ence “buys” the comedy-romance story, it is hard to
escape those feelings because reversed rational argu-
ments suggest so. Incentives to include “the other’s” per-
spective in reflection and argumentation are hampered;
communication is restricted to flow within our taken-for-
granted echo chambers. In fact, with the ascent of racial-
ized comedy-romances, both the communication of in-
conclusive boundaries (e.g., Merkel’s European Solution
story in Stage I) and the presence of diversities and
complexities of Turkish–German belonging (e.g., reac-
tions to Armenian Genocide resolution in Stage II) dis-
appear over time. Inclusion of Turkish–German perspec-
tives emerged only after ostentatious performances of
German “Leitkultur,” which was welcomed as a clear-
cut decision for loyalty to Germany instead of Turkey by
German authorities.
Further, it became apparent in the analysis that the
Enlightenment past embodies a seminal cultural reper-
toire in German political culture. The romanticized trans-
mission and ancestral roots restrict this cultural reper-
toire to a world of “idealized existence” of a German
ethno-national community. Tragic and ironic extensions
to comedy are blocked, pure comedies or comedies push-
ing for romanticism are facilitated. Hence, this cultural
repertoire feeds into cultural boundaries and racialized
boundaries due to its ancestral purification of the ethno-
national German hero(ine). The community mobilising
around such a hero(ine) derives its cultural and/or ethno-
racial commonality from an idealized remembrance of
a past achievement which is hard to affirm by “new-
comers”: They may perform it on the individual level,
yet have no legitimate right of shared ownership or
membership on the collective level. Not only is ethno-
cultural and ethno-racial difference created through the
Enlightenment cultural repertoire, but feelings of cul-
tural or racial superiority are also fostered through
that idealized and particularizing remembrance of the
Enlightenment past.
Given the identified adaptation of far-right narra-
tives of “ethno-national rebirth” story, what are the av-
enues for future research? To begin with, comparative
research may explore whether the identified adaptation
is able to travel globally across cases in time and space.
Secondly, this article’s transnational agenda is open to ex-
tension. That is, to historically, and more systematically,
assess the possible effects of Turkey’s nostalgic return to
neo-Ottoman identity on stories of Turkish–German be-
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longing. A case in point is marked by an October 2015
image of the meeting between Merkel and Erdoğan in
Turkey’s then newly-built presidential palace. Its iconog-
raphy made western European media immediately sig-
nify a “Sultan.” Beyond orientalist demarcation by “the
West,” such images may be associated with authority
and strength by some members of the in-group, while
others may fear a turn to ancestral backwardness (e.g.,
autocracy). In this context, a fine-grained focus (ethno-
graphic) research of the narrative (genre) organisation
of belonging among the diverse strings of Turkish im-
migrant associations and movements in Germany poses
an interesting avenue for future research in this field.
Finally, yet another puzzle deserving of further study
is “gendered storytelling.” For instance, the theorising
of the prevalent gendered romantic trope, “a fairy-tale
princess kisses a frog prince for a happy ending” into the
analysis of politics of belonging seems essential. A gen-
dered storytelling approach might certainly ameliorate
our understanding of the politics of Turkish–German be-
longing by asking: Who was the frog prince(ss) in the
Great Secession drama? What were the gendered cul-
tural repertoires that were disseminated?
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